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Abstract. This paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching.
The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the
set of Nash equilibria, nor do they alter the predictions of dynamic adjustment theories based on
imitation or best responses to others’ decisions. As would be expected, however, increases in
effort cost result in reduced effort levels. Average behavior in the final periods is consistent with
a one-parameter stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium that is calculated by
maximizing a "stochastic potential function." The noise parameter estimated from the initial two-
person, minimum-effort games is used to predict behavior in subsequent experiments with three-
person games, using both minimum and medium-effort payoff structures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After the prisoner’s dilemma, the coordination game is perhaps the most widely discussed
paradigm in game theory. Interest in coordination games stems from the presence of multiple
Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked, which raises the possibility of "getting stuck" in an
outcome that is undesirable for all players. For this reason, this class of games is of interest to
macroeconomists (Bryant, 1983; Cooper and John, 1988; and Romer, 1996). Since (generically)
all equilibria are strict, standard refinements leave the set of Nash equilibria unchanged, which
has prompted game theorists to search for new selection criteria. An array of alternative theories
of behavior in coordination games have been put forward, both static and dynamic. Static
approaches include Pareto dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988), risk dominance (Harsanyi,
1995; Carlsson and van Damme, 1993), and "noisy" equilibrium models (Anderson, Goeree, and
Holt, 1997b; Carlsson and Ganslandt, 1998). Dynamic models of coordination behavior can be
roughly divided into evolutionary models (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993;
Crawford, 1991), adaptive learning models (Crawford, 1995; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Rankin,
1995), and "noisy" learning models (Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck, 1997; Camerer and
Ho, 1999).
Some theorists argue that coordination game experiments are useless for game theory
because the Nash equilibrium and its refinements have no predictive power in this case and, as
a consequence, "anything goes." We feel that the opposite is true: the unexpected empirical
regularities observed in coordination experiments (such as the ones reported in this paper) can
guide further theoretical work. For instance, previous experiments have shown that coordination
problems cannot be ruled out by an assumption that agents somehow find the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium. Indeed, some of the most widely cited results from laboratory experiments provide
cases where subjects end up at the Nash equilibrium that is worst for all concerned (Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil, 1990; Cooper et al., 1992; and the survey in Ochs, 1995). Since much of the
theoretical work was motivated by the need to explain coordination failures in the laboratory, it
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2is now time to return to return to the laboratory and carry out experiments designed explicitly
to evaluate some of these theories.
This paper reports the results of several new coordination experiments motivated by both
static and dynamic models of behavior in coordination games. The first game to be considered
is one in which pairs of subjects choose an effort level, and the resulting payoff is the minimum
of the efforts minus the cost of one’s own effort. This payoff structure can arise from a joint
production process in which the group output is proportional to the minimum of the individual
inputs, as is the case with perfect complementarity. The different treatments are based on a
change in the common cost per unit of effort. As long as this cost is less than one, the best
response to any set of others’ efforts is just the minimum of those efforts, so (non-critical)
changes in the cost of effort will not alter the set of Nash equilibria in pure strategies, nor will
they change the predictions of any dynamic theory that is based on adjustment toward the best
response to efforts observed in the previous period. Changes in the cost of effort do affect the
relative costs of "errors" in overshooting or undershooting the minimum of other’s efforts, so
theories like risk dominance and maximum potential (discussed below) that take into account the
costs of errors will be sensitive to the effort cost parameter.
The data of this first experiment allow us to test and calibrate an equilibrium model of
noisy behavior. This equilibrium results by maximizing a stochastic potential function and can
be seen as a one-parameter stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium. To get a sense for
how robust this approach is, we estimate the relevant parameter using data from the six sessions
with two-person coordination games and use this estimate for "out-of-sample" prediction in seven
new sessions with three-person games. These new sessions include both minimum-effort and
median-effort coordination games.
The paper is organized as follows: the theoretical motivation for the experimental design
is discussed in more detail in section 2, and section 3 presents the laboratory results. The notion
of stochastic potential is introduced in section 4, and is related to the notion of a logit
equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). Section 5 reports experiments based on three-person
median and minimum-effort games. The final section concludes, and a set of instructions and
the laboratory data can be found in the Appendices.
32. PARETO DOMINANCE, RISK DOMINANCE, AND MAXIMUM POTENTIAL
The experiment involves a series of single-period coordination games with groups of
randomly matched subjects who make independent "effort" choices. Subjects selected efforts
from a continuous interval [_e, −e], i.e. fractional efforts were allowed. We first review some
standard theoretical results for this game in order to motivate the choice of treatment parameters.
Let the effort for player i be denoted by ei ∈ [_e, −e], i = 1,...,n. The payoffs for a symmetric, n-
person minimum-effort game are:
where c is the effort cost. As long as c is less than 1, payoffs are maximized when all players
(1)pi i (e1, ... ,en ) min{e1, ... , en } cei , i 1, ... ,n ,
choose the highest possible effort.1 Note, however, that any common effort level constitutes a
Nash equilibrium, since a costly unilateral increase in effort will not raise the minimum, and a
unilateral decrease will reduce the minimum by more than the cost when c < 1. This argument
does not depend on the number of players, so non-critical changes in c and n will not alter the
set of Nash equilibria in pure strategies, despite the reasonable expectation that efforts should be
high for sufficiently low effort costs and low numbers of participants.2
Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) notion of risk dominance is sensitive to the effort cost that
determines the losses associated with deviations from best responses to others’ decisions. To
illustrate the concept of risk dominance, consider the two-person minimum-effort game shown
in Figure 1 in which efforts are constrained to be the integers 1 or 2. When both players are
choosing efforts of 1, the cost of a unilateral deviation to 2 is just the cost of the extra effort, c,
which will be referred to as the "deviation loss." Similarly, the deviation loss at the (2,2)
equilibrium is 1-c, since a unilateral reduction in effort reduces the minimum by 1 but saves the
marginal effort cost c. The deviation loss from the low-effort equilibrium is greater than that for
1 If the minimum effort in (1) is multiplied by a constant α, as is the case in some laboratory experiments, then
the relevant value of c is the effort cost divided by α. Although we normalize so that α = 1, this observation is relevant
in considering the implications of risk dominance for experiments where this is not the case.
2 Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1997b) show that there are a continuum of (two-point) mixed Nash equilibria, but
that each of these has the perverse comparative statics property that an increase in the effort cost will raise the probability
associated with the higher of the two effort levels over which randomization occurs.
4the high-effort equilibrium if c > 1 - c, or equivalently, if c > 1/2, in which case we say that the
low-effort equilibrium is risk dominant.3 Risk dominance, therefore, has the desirable property
that it selects the low-effort outcome if the cost of effort is sufficiently high.
There is, however, no consensus on how to generalize risk dominance for games with
Figure 1. A 2×2 Coordination Game
Player 2’s Effort
1 2
Player 1’s
Effort
1 1 - c, 1 - c 1 - c, 1 - 2c
2 1 - 2c, 1 - c 2 - 2c, 2 - 2c
more players, a continuum of decisions, etc. A related concept that does generalize is the notion
of maximization of a "potential" of a game.4 Loosely speaking, the idea behind potential is to
find a function for a game that is maximized by a Nash equilibrium for that game. More
precisely, a potential function for a game is a function of all players’ decisions with partial
derivatives that match those of individual players’ payoffs with respect to their own decisions.
For example, it is straightforward to show that the potential function for the 2 × 2 coordination
game in Table I is given by: V = p1 p2 - (1 - c)(p1 + p2), where pi denotes the probability with
which player i chooses the low effort 1.5 Hence, the potential is maximized in the low-effort
outcome (p1=p2=1) when c > 1/2 and it is maximized in the high-effort outcome (p1=p2=0) when
c < 1/2. For the 2 × 2 coordination game shown in Table I, risk-dominance and maximum
potential thus coincide, and one can easily show that this equivalence holds for all symmetric 2
× 2 games. Laboratory experiments based on 2 × 2 coordination games show that the risk
dominant/maximum potential outcome has a lot of drawing power when the difference in
3 The application of risk dominance for asymmetric two-person games is equivalent to comparing the product of
the two players’ deviations losses at each equilibrium.
4 Rosenthal (1973) first used a potential function to study properties of a Nash equilibrium. Monderer and Shapley
(1996) provide a general treatment.
5 Player i’s payoff of choosing the low effort with probability pi is: pii(pi,pj) = pi pj - pi(1-c) -pj + (2-2c), and it is
straightforward to check that ∂Vi/∂pi = ∂pii/∂pi for i = 1, 2.
5potential is large, even though play usually starts out near the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for
which the payoffs may be much higher (see Table 4 in Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck,
1997; see also Straub, 1995).
However, as noted above, risk-dominance does not apply to more general settings while
the notion of maximum potential does. For instance, for the n-player minimum effort game given
in (1), the potential function is simply the common production function that determines a single
player’s payoff, minus the sum of all players’ effort costs:
The inclusion of all effort costs is needed to ensure that ∂Vi/∂ei = ∂pii/∂ei, i = 1,..., n, for all
(2)V (e1, ... , en ) min{e1, ... ,en } c
n
i 1
ei .
feasible vectors of decisions, when these derivatives exist. The maximization of potential will
obviously require equal effort levels. At any common effort, e, the potential in (2) becomes:
V = e - nce, which is maximized at the lowest effort when nc > 1, and is maximized at the
highest effort when nc < 1. In two-person games, this condition reduces to the risk dominance
comparison of c with 1/2. Hence, the Nash equilibrium that maximizes potential in this game
is sensitive to parameters that may affect actual behavior.
The notion of potential can be used to evaluate results from previous laboratory
experiments. The most widely cited coordination experiment is that of Van Huyck, Battalio, and
Beil (1990), who conducted games with 14 to 16 players and an effort cost of either 0 or 1/2,
so nc was either zero or about seven.6 Compared to the critical nc value of 1, these parameter
choices appear rather extreme, which may explain why their data exhibit a huge shift in effort
decisions. By the last round in the experiments in which nc = 0, almost all (96%) participants
chose the highest possible effort, while over three-quarters chose the lowest possible effort when
nc was around seven. One purpose of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s experiment was to show
that a Pareto-inferior outcome may arise in coordination games, presumably because it is harder
for large numbers of participants to coordinate on good outcomes in games where the payoff is
6 The minimum effort in the experiment was multiplied by a constant, which is normalized to be 1 in equation (1)
above. Therefore, the relevant value of c for the experiment is calculated as the ratio of the cost of effort and the
coefficient of the minimum effort.
6determined by the minimum of all efforts. Other experiments were conducted with 2 players,
but the payoff parameters were such that nc exactly equaled the critical value 1, and, with a
random matching protocol, the data showed a lot of variability.7 Our experiment also
implements two-person random matchings in order to avoid serious possibility of tacit collusion
in repeated games, which may drive efforts to maximal levels in sufficiently long series of
repeated two-person coordination games. Given the knife-edge properties of c = 1/2 for two-
person coordination games, we conducted one treatment with c = 1/4 and another with c = 3/4.
As noted above, this change does not alter the predictions of theories based on best responses to
others’ decisions, e.g. pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
3. THE EXPERIMENT
Recall that one purpose of our experiment is to generate conditions such that behavior is
"non-extreme," i.e. find conditions under which decisions do not necessarily end up at the
boundaries. One step in this direction is to have more than just a few possible effort levels.
Therefore, we let subjects choose from a continuous interval: [110, 170]. We chose this
particular range with the object of avoiding a highly focal number like 50 or 100, and we did not
want 150 to be at the midpoint of the range.8 Furthermore, this choice facilitates the comparison
of our results with those of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) who let subjects choose integer
effort levels that ranged from 1 to 7.
The experimental design involved six sessions, each with 10 student subjects recruited
from undergraduate economics classes at the University of Virginia. No subject had previously
participated in a coordination game. Upon arrival, participants were seated in visually isolated
booths. We began by reading the instructions in Appendix A. The payoffs were explained in
words and with symbols, e.g.: "you will receive a penny amount that equals the minimum of the
two efforts chosen, minus the cost of your own effort, which is .25 times your own effort
choice." There were no numerical examples in the instructions, in order to avoid focal
7 When subjects were matched with the same partner period after period the data often converged to the maximum
effort.
8 Although focalness plays no role in our theory, we believe that it can be important, especially in coordination
games.
7suggestions. Questions were asked and answered privately to avoid suggestive statements.
Subjects were told that there would be 10 periods of random pairings determined by draws
of numbered ping-pong balls from a bucket. The noise of ping-pong draws probably made this
random matching procedure more credible. At the start of each period, subjects were prompted
to record an effort decision and write it on a record sheet provided. The range of feasible effort
choices was specified to be the interval [110, 170], with fractional efforts allowed, which they
could select by using decimal points. We then collected the record sheets, paired subjects, and
recorded the "other person’s decision" and the person’s own earnings. The sheets were returned
at the beginning of the next period. The process took about one hour.9
Three sessions were conducted under the high-cost treatment (c = 3/4) and three under
Figure 2. A Coordination Game: Average Effort Decisions by Period
Key: Dashed lines are session averages. Dark lines are averages across all sessions in a treatment.
9 The instructions stated that the 10 periods of random matching would be followed by "a different experiment."
In fact, these two-person coordination games were followed by a series of 6-9 one-period games of chicken, matching
pennies, etc.
8the low-cost treatment (c = 1/4).10 The period-by-period averages for each session are shown
as thin lines in Figure 2, and the averages for all sessions in each treatment are shown as thick
lines. The data exhibit a couple of interesting features. First, the averages of all sessions begin
near the midpoint of the range of feasible effort choices on the vertical axis. Figure 3 shows the
histograms of the effort decisions in the first and in the last three periods for the high-cost
treatment (light) and low-cost treatment (dark). For both values of the effort cost, the null
hypothesis that the initial distributions are equal to a uniform distribution cannot be rejected at
the 10 percent level using a standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.11 Second, even though all
sessions start out similarly, a clear separation is apparent by the fifth period. For later periods,
the null hypothesis of no treatment effect can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance
using a non-parametric test.12 In the last three periods, all decisions in the low-cost sessions
are above the midpoint (140), while almost all decisions are below the midpoint with a high cost,
as shown in Figure 3. Finally, the average effort trajectories seem to spread symmetrically
around the midpoint: the upward trend for the three low-effort-cost sessions is reflected by an
essentially symmetric downward trend for the three high-effort-cost sessions. To summarize the
main findings: a change in the effort cost has a large and significant effect on behavior in the
minimum-effort coordination game, an effect that is not predicted by the Nash equilibrium.
The strong treatment effect that is driving the data is simply not predicted in a Nash
equilibrium, nor do the data converge to extreme values as would be implied by maximum
potential. There is usually some noise in laboratory data with non-extreme payoff parameters,
10 This created somewhat of a dilemma, since earnings are much lower under the high-cost treatment. We dealt
with this issue by increasing the fixed payment from the customary level of $6 to a level, $12, that would ensure
reasonable earnings for the first hour, even for the high-cost treatment. (The $6 initial payment was used in session 1,
with the low-effort-cost treatment, but the higher initial payment was used in all subsequent sessions.) Including the fixed
payment, most subjects’ earnings were in the $7 to $9 range in 0.25 treatment, and in the $16 to $18 range in the 0.75
treatment. These earnings were augmented in the one-period games that followed.
11 Comparing the empirical distribution functions with a uniform distribution results in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic of .2 for both treatments, while the critical value is .22 for a sample size of 30 and a confidence level of 10
percent. The null hypothesis that the first-period empirical distributions for the two treatments are the same cannot be
rejected at much higher levels.
12 The intuition behind the test is clear. There are "six-take-three" = 20 possible ways that the effort averages could
have been ranked, and of these the most extreme ranking was observed, with all three low-c sessions having the highest
ranks. The probability of this outcome under the null is, therefore, 1/20 = 0.05.
9and to deal with this it is useful to consider notions of noisy behavior. The next section
Figure 3. Effort Choice Frequencies in Period 1 (Top) and Periods 8 - 10 (Bottom)
Key: Light Bars Correspond to High Effort Cost and Dark Bars to Low Effort Cost
introduces a generalization of potential that is related to a noisy version of the Nash equilibrium.
4. STOCHASTIC POTENTIAL AND THE LOGIT EQUILIBRIUM
If a game has a potential function V, the stochastic potential is based on a consideration
of probability distributions of decisions that determine the expected value of potential (Anderson,
Goeree, and Holt, 1997). In particular, the stochastic potential for given distributions of players’
decisions is the expected value of the ordinary potential, denoted E{V}, plus terms that will make
the maximand sensitive to noise in the choice distributions. These terms that determine the value
of dispersion correspond to the physical concept of "entropy." In the case of a continuous
10
density function, fi(ei), entropy is defined as: -∫fi ln(fi) dei .13 The entropy for the system is the
sum of the entropy terms for individual players’ distributions, weighted by an error parameter
µ. Thus the stochastic potential is: E{V} - µ Σi ∫fi ln(fi) dei, where the sum is over all player
indices and the integral is over the range of feasible effort choices. Since entropy is maximized
by complete randomness (a uniform distribution of decisions), the distribution that maximizes
expected potential plus µ times entropy will be more dispersed as the error parameter increases.
In the other limit as µ → 0, the entropy term becomes irrelevant and the maximization of
stochastic potential becomes equivalent to the maximization of ordinary potential, which leads
to a Nash equilibrium in this context. Thus the maximization of stochastic potential provides a
generalization of Nash that is parameterized by an error parameter µ. In the remainder of this
section, we will determine the predicted effort distributions for each of the values of the
treatment variable c.
For the case of two players, the expected value of the potential function in (2) contains
a term that is the expected value of the minimum of two decisions. If player i uses a continuous
choice density fi(ei), with corresponding distribution function Fi(ei), then the distribution function
for the minimum of the two effort decisions is: 1 - (1-F1(e1))(1-F2(e2)).14 The stochastic
potential, VS, is calculated by adding weighted entropy terms to the expected value of the
minimum and subtracting the expected effort costs:15
Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1997b) show that maximization of the stochastic potential requires
(3)VS ⌡⌠
e
e
2
i 1
(1 Fi (e )) de c
2
i 1 ⌡
⌠
e
e
(1 Fi (e )) de µ
2
i 1 ⌡
⌠
e
e
fi (e ) log( fi (e )) de .
symmetry across players, i.e. F1(e) = F2(e) = F(e), as is the case without noise. Maximization
13 In a more commonly considered discrete case, entropy is -Σi pi ln(pi), where the pi are the probabilities of the
discrete outcomes.
14 This formula can be found in standard treatments of order statistics, or it can be verified directly since the
probability that the minimum is below a given value of x is 1 minus the probability that both efforts are above x, which
yields the formula in the text.
15 Recall that the expected value of a random variable with distribution function F can be written as the integral
of 1 - F (ignoring possible boundary terms that are independent of F).
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of the stochastic potential with respect to the common distribution F(e) is a straightforward
calculus-of-variations problem, and the necessary condition can be expressed:16
which is a differential equation in the common distribution function.
(4)µ f (e) f (e) ( 1 F(e) c ) ,
Consider the intuition behind (4). If the other player is using an effort distribution, F(e),
then an increase in effort at e will raise the minimum with probability 1 - F(e) and increase the
cost at a rate c, so the 1 - F(e) - c term is the derivative of the expected payoff with respect to
one’s own effort. Hence, equation (4) can also be written as: µ f´(e) = pie´(e) f(e), which defines
the continuous version of the "logit equilibrium" (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).17 Anderson,
Goeree, and Holt (1997b) show that a solution to (4) exists, is unique, and that an increase in the
effort cost lowers efforts in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance.18, 19 Thus the
prediction of this stochastic-potential approach is consistent with the intuitive notion that
reductions in the effort cost will increase efforts, although not necessarily all the way to the
maximum possible effort.
We used data from the coordination experiment to estimate the equilibrium model in (4)
16 Recall that the Euler condition for maximizing ∫I(F, f, x) dx is: δI/δF = ∂I/∂F - d/dx{∂I/∂f } = 0, or in the present
context: - 2 (1-F) + 2 c + 2 d/dx{µ + µlnf } = - 2 (1-F-c) + 2µf´/f = 0, where f´ denotes the derivative of the density
function. This result can be rearranged to obtain the expression in (4).
17 As the error parameter goes to infinity, the marginal payoff becomes irrelevant and the solution to (4) will have
a flat density, i.e. f´(e) = 0, which yields a uniform effort distribution. As the error parameter goes to 0, equation (4)
implies that marginal payoff is zero whenever f(e) is positive. This in turn requires that F(e) be constant at 1 - c, which
is contradicted if the density is positive on an interval, i.e. the only possibility is that all mass is concentrated at a single
point in the limit (at one of the common-effort Nash equilibria).
18 In fact, the differential equation (4) can be solved explicitly to obtain a logistic density.
19 We will use the concepts of logit equilibrium and maximization of stochastic potential interchangeably, although
they differ in a subtle way. In particular, the variational condition in (4) is a first-order condition, and therefore, a logit
equilibrium may be a local minimum of the stochastic potential. Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1997a) show that local
minima are unstable for a dynamic gradient-based adjustment process with Brownian motion, whereas local maxima are
stable. Since we have proved that the logit equilibrium is unique for this game (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1997b), it
is globally stable for the evolutionary adjustment process. Incidentally, the noisy evolutionary adjustment process explains
the symmetric adjustment patterns in Figure 2 (see Goeree and Holt, 1999). It is worth noting that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between logit equilibria and extreme points of stochastic potential, whereas this equivalence does not hold
for the twin concepts of the Nash equilibrium and (deterministic) potential. For example, there is a continuum of Nash
equilibria for the coordination game, but only one maximizes potential when cn ≠ 1/2.
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directly, by dividing the interval [110, 170] into one-cent intervals and replacing the density
function in (4) with probabilities.20 Thus (4) becomes a set of simultaneous equations that
determine the equilibrium probabilities for each effort level, and for a given value of µ the
equations in (4) can be solved using numerical methods. The likelihood is the product of the
calculated probabilities of the decisions actually observed and is maximized by iterating over µ.
This yields an estimated value of µ = 7.4(0.3), with the standard error in parentheses.21
Table I shows the average effort levels (standard deviations) in the final three periods by
Table I. Average Effort Levels in Periods 8-10 (Standard Deviations)
session 1 session 2 session 3 Pooled Logit Equilibrium
low cost (c = 1/4) 151 (10) 166 (5) 159 (12) 159 (11) 154 (12)
high cost (c = 3/4) 131 (11) 112 (5) 135 (11) 126 (14) 126 (12)
session and pooled over all three sessions in each treatment. For both values of the effort cost,
two of the three session averages are within one standard deviation of the average predicted by
the logit equilibrium that maximizes stochastic potential. There are, however, unexplained
differences between different sessions in the same treatment (cohort effects). Consider, for
instance, session 2 of the high-cost treatment, in which initial behavior in the first three periods
is more extreme than in the other high-cost sessions. Subsequent effort choices are lower and
20 Clearly, the data show some systematic time patterns in the early periods, which is why we only used the last
three periods to estimate the equilibrium value of µ.
21 The error parameter estimate is of the same magnitude as other equilibrium error rates for different games with
similar procedures and subjects, e.g. Capra, et al. (1999). This error rate, however, is higher than the µ estimates that we
obtained by directly estimating a dynamic learning model based on fictitious play (not reported here). The higher µ
estimate for the equilibrium model is mainly due to "between sessions" variance (rather than "within sessions" variance):
the final-period averages differ significantly between sessions within the same treatment, and only a relatively large error
parameter is consistent with the combined data. This cohort effect is less of a problem for the dynamic model which
allows for history dependence: for example, higher-than-average effort choices in the final periods can be consistent with
a low error rate when they are caused by optimistic beliefs due to high effort choices in the early periods. It is in this
sense that a learning model can describe the (individual) data better than an equilibrium model, although both explain the
cost effects that are not predicted by the Nash equilibrium. Learning models that use data up to period t to predict
outcomes in the next period will generally have lower prediction errors than equilibrium models that are intended to
predict where decisions will settle down after learning has occurred.
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gravitate towards the lower boundary 110, presumably because beliefs are more pessimistic. This
"history dependence" is not picked up by equilibrium models such as the one implied by
maximizing stochastic potential. Nevertheless, the predictions that follow from maximizing
stochastic potential are remarkably accurate when we aggregate the sessions in the same
treatment. The averages for the two treatments end up at about 126(14) for the high-cost
treatment and at 159(11) for the low-cost treatment, which is only slightly more extreme than the
stochastic potential predictions of 126(12) and 154(12) based on the estimated error parameter.
To summarize: The average effort trajectories spread symmetrically and converge to levels near
those implied by maximizing the stochastic potential function.
5. MINIMUM AND MEDIAN-EFFORT GAMES WITH THREE PLAYERS
Some researchers have suggested that two is the critical number of players for efficient
coordination. For instance, in the minimum-effort coordination experiments of Knez and
Camerer (1994), coordination gets steadily worse with larger groups and the biggest decrease in
efficiency occurs when going from two to three players. Their explanation is that with more than
two players, beliefs about others’ behavior become ambiguous: while two players only have to
worry about each others’ beliefs about one another, the introduction of additional players forces
everyone to think about beliefs one opponent has about another.
From the point of view of maximum (stochastic) potential, however, there is nothing
special about a group size of two: depending on the value of nc, average effort levels may be
either low or high with two players (see Figure 2), and the same is true for three (or more)
players. To test this prediction, we ran two new minimum-effort coordination sessions, now with
cohorts of twelve subjects being randomly matched in groups of three. The effort-cost was 1/2
in the high-cost treatment and 1/10 and in the low-cost treatment.22 In order to get an ex ante
prediction for the average effort levels in the final periods, we shall use µ = 7.4, which was
estimated from the two-person experiment. The population density that maximizes the stochastic
22 We would liked to have set c = 1/6 (instead of c = 1/10) in the low-cost treatment to preserve symmetry around
nc = 1, but we felt that this would complicate payoff calculations too much and slow down the experiments, which were
done by hand. The low value of 1/10, however, has the disadvantage that it can cause decisions to "lock" onto the upper
boundary.
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potential is characterized by the three-person generalization of equation (4):
Equation (5) can be derived as follows. Recall that, in general, the condition for stochastic
(5)µ f (e) f (e) ((1 F (e ))2 c ) .
potential maximization is given by the logit-equilibrium condition: µ f´(e) = pie´(e) f(e). An
increase in effort raises costs at a rate c and results in a higher minimum effort only if the others’
efforts are higher, which occurs with probability (1 - F)2. Hence marginal payoffs are: pie´ = (1 -
F)2 - c, which together with the logit condition yields (5). Using the estimated value of 7.4 for
the error parameter, equation (5) can be solved numerically and the resulting predictions for the
average effort levels are: 154 for c = 1/10 and 129 for c = 1/2, and the standard deviation of the
average is 8 in each case. The period-by-period average effort levels for both treatments are
shown in Figure 4.
Both sessions start out at the same level, which falls in the same range (between 140 and
Figure 4. A Three-Person Minimum-Effort Coordination Game: Average Effort Decisions
Key: Averages by period for c = 1/10 (top) and c = 1/2 (bottom).
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150) as in the sessions with random pairings. As predicted, however, average effort levels in the
high-cost session fall while average effort levels rise in the low-cost session. The average efforts
for the high-cost session end up quite close to the logit predictions.23
A Median-Effort Coordination Game
Another characteristic of coordination experiments done to date is that when payoffs are
determined by the median effort, the dynamics exhibit strong history-dependence: i.e. final
outcomes are largely determined by initial play (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1991). In all of
the twelve sessions that they report, the median choice remained the same in each period and the
final outcome was completely determined by first-period play. In addition, subjects’ behavior
showed little variation over time, in contrast with the adjustment patterns in minimum-effort
games (see also Crawford, 1995).
The payoff structure in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1991) differs from (1) in two
ways. The minimum of all efforts is replaced by the median, and, more importantly, a cost is
added that is quadratic in the distance between a player’s effort and the median of all effort
choices. The latter change may have an effect on behavior and could be part of the reason why
the data show such strong history dependence. We will consider a three-person median-effort
coordination game with a payoff structure that is more closely related to (1). In particular, all
three players receive the median, or middle, effort choice minus the cost of their own effort:
pii(e1,e2,e3) = median{e1,e2,e3} - c ei, with c the effort-cost parameter. This median-effort game
has a continuum of asymmetric Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in which two players choose a
common effort level, e, and the third player chooses the lowest possible effort _e. This
asymmetric outcome is unlikely to be observed when players are randomly matched and drawn
from the same pool, and it seems more sensible to characterize the entire population of players
by a common distribution function F, with corresponding density f. The condition implied by
maximum stochastic potential is: µ f´(e) = pie´(e) f(e), and the marginal payoff function can be
derived in the same manner as above. An increase in effort raises costs at a rate c and affects
23 The low-cost session, however, provides an example of "lock-in dynamics:" there is no more residual noise and
behavior gets stuck at the upper boundary after period 7.
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the median only if one of the other players is choosing a higher effort level and the other a lower
effort level, which happens with probability 2F(1-F). Hence, the condition for maximum
stochastic potential becomes:
We conducted four sessions with this particular game form, with effort-cost parameters
(6)µ f (e) f (e) (2 F (e ) (1 F (e ) ) c ) .
of c = 0.1, c = 0.4, and c = 0.6 respectively. The predictions for the final-period average effort
levels that follow from (10) (again with µ = 7.4) are: 150 for c = 0.1, 140 for c = 0.4, and 130
for c = 0.6 with a standard deviation of 8 in each case. The observed average efforts in the last
three periods for these sessions were 157 (c = 0.1), 136 and 138 (c = 0.4), and 113 (c = 0.6)
respectively. Notice that three of the four averages are within one standard deviation of the
relevant theoretical prediction.
Figure 5 shows the period-by-period averages for each treatment. Average efforts start
Figure 5: A Median-Effort Coordination Game: Average Effort Decisions
Key: Averages by period for c = 0.1 (top), c = 0.4 (middle), and c = 0.6 (bottom).
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at roughly the same level, but rise in the session with the lowest effort cost and fall in the one
with the highest cost. The sessions with the intermediate effort cost have relatively flat
trajectories, which is consistent with history dependence, but the final level is also predicted by
maximizing stochastic potential. For later periods, the null hypothesis of no treatment effect can
be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance using a non-parametric test.24 To summarize:
behavior in three-person minimum and median-effort coordination games is sensitive to changes
in the effort cost that do not affect the set of Nash equilibria. In most sessions, average effort
levels in final periods are close to those implied by maximization of stochastic potential.
6. CONCLUSION
Coordination games are of interest to both macroeconomists and microeconomists because
the presence of multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria raises the possibility of failure to
coordinate on a "good" outcome. One direction of research has been to devise and study
mechanisms that facilitate profitable coordination. In addition, theorists have studied coordination
games extensively because the presence of multiple equilibria provides a useful platform for the
analysis of strategic behavior. This paper reports a new set of experimental data generated by
changes in the economic variables, i.e. effort cost and group size, which should affect the
likelihood of successful coordination.
In the continuous minimum-effort game, a unilateral increase in effort above some
common level will reduce one’s payoff by c per unit effort, whereas a unilateral one-unit
decrease in effort will reduce payoff by 1 - c, since the minimum effort is reduced by 1. Thus
any common effort level is a Nash equilibrium, but intuition suggests that the average effort
levels should depend on the relative losses from over-shooting or under-shooting the other’s
effort, i.e. on whether c is greater than or less than 1/2. The widely cited notion of "risk
dominance" uses these "deviation losses" to predict which outcome will occur in a two-decision
game. One way to generalize risk dominance to economic situations with a continuum of
decisions is to consider the equilibrium that maximizes a "potential function." In the two-person
24 There are 24 possible ways that the effort averages could have been ranked, and of these only two rankings are
as extreme as the one observed. The probability of this outcome under the null is, therefore, 2/24 = 0.09.
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coordination game, this procedure selects the equilibrium with the highest possible effort when
c < 1/2 and with the lowest possible effort when c > 1/2. This paper presents the results of a
laboratory experiment using effort cost parameters of 1/4 and 3/4. The effort-cost treatment
separates the data nicely, with symmetric increases for low effort costs and decreases for high
effort costs, as shown by the dark lines in Figure 2 that track the average efforts by treatment
for each period.
The data averages do not converge to the upper and lower boundaries, as implied by the
maximization of potential, and the residual noise in the data suggests the incorporation of
stochastic elements, reflecting noisy response to asymmetries in deviation losses. We use a
"stochastic potential" function which includes an entropy term that is weighted by an estimated
error parameter. The final-period averages are close to the levels that maximize stochastic
potential. Follow-up experiments show that this approach is also useful in organizing the data
from different contexts, e.g. three-person minimum and median effort-coordination games.
Overall, this combination of theory and experiment provides a coherent picture of behavioral
responses to key economic incentives and can be useful in designing mechanisms that facilitate
coordination.
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Appendix A: Instructions (for the c = 0.25 treatment)
Introduction
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The funding for
this study has been provided by several foundations. The instructions are simple, and by
following them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At this time, you will
be given $6 for coming on time. All the money that you earn subsequently will be yours to
keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash today at the end of this experiment. We will
start by reading the instructions, and then you will have the opportunity to ask questions about
the procedures described.
Earnings
The experiment consists of a number of periods. In each period, you will be randomly
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other participant
make will determine the amount earned by each of you. At the beginning of each period, you
will choose a number or "effort level" between 110 and 170. Effort choices will be made by
writing the effort level on a decision sheet that is attached to these instructions. Your effort
choice may be any amount between and including 110 and 170. That is, we allow fractions. The
person who you are matched with will also choose an effort level between and including 110 and
170. Your earnings are determined as follows: you will receive a penny amount that equals the
minimum of the two effort levels chosen, minus the cost of your effort, which is .25 times your
own effort choice. So if the effort levels are equal, both players receive their effort level minus
.25 times their effort level (in pennies). If the effort levels are not equal, both players get the
lower of the two effort levels, minus .25 times their effort level.
Example: Suppose that your effort is X and the other's effort is Y.
If X = Y, you get X - (.25) X, and the other gets Y - (.25) Y.
If X > Y, you get Y - (.25) X, and the other gets Y - (.25) Y.
If X < Y, you get X - (.25) X, and the other gets X - (.25) Y.
To reiterate, you each earn a number of pennies that equals the minimum effort, minus the cost
of your own effort. In addition to the earnings determined in this manner, you will earn a fixed
amount of 60 cents per round.
Record of Results
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the last one
attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in the top-right part of this
sheet. Now, please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A. Going from left to
right, you will see columns for the “period,” “your effort,” “other’s effort,” “minimum effort,”
"effort cost," and “your earnings.” You begin by writing down your effort choice in the
appropriate column. As mentioned above, this effort must be greater than or equal to 110 and
less than or equal to 170, and the effort can be any amount in this range, (i.e. fractional effort
levels are allowed). Use decimals to separate fractions. For example, wxy.z indicates wxy units
of effort plus z/10 of a unit.
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After you make and record your decision for period one, we will collect all decision
sheets. Then we will draw numbered ping pong balls to match each of you with another person.
Here we have a container with ping pong balls, each ball has one of your identification numbers
on it. We will draw the ping pong balls to determine who is matched with whom. After we
have matched someone with you, we will write the other’s effort decision, the minimum effort,
the cost of your own effort, and your earnings in the relevant columns of your decision sheet and
return it to you. Then, you make and record your decision for period two, we collect all decision
sheets, draw ping pong balls to randomly match you with another person, and calculate your
earnings as above. This same process is repeated a total number of ten times. Notice that the
far right column in record sheet lists the additional 60 cents that you earn each round.
Summary
To begin, participants make and record their effort choices by writing the effort level in
the appropriate column of the decision sheet. Then the decision sheets are collected and
participants are randomly matched using draws of numbered ping pong balls. Once the matching
is done, the other’s effort, the minimum effort, the effort cost, and the earnings are written on
each person’s decision sheet. Then decision sheets are returned, and participants make and
record their effort levels for the next period. The decisions determine each person’s earnings in
pennies as described above (you will receive an amount that equals the minimum of your effort
and the other person’s effort, minus the cost of your effort, which is (.25) times your effort
level). Note that a new random matching is done in each period. After we finish all periods,
we will read to you the instructions for a different experiment.
Final Remarks
At the end of today’s session, we will pay to you, privately in cash, the amount that you
have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this exercise to determine your
total earnings (earnings will be rounded off to the nearest penny amount). You have already
received the $6 participation payment. Therefore, if you earn an amount X during the exercise
that follows, you will receive a total amount of $6.00 + X. Your earnings are your own business,
and you do not have to discuss them with anyone.
During the experiment, you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your hand and
one of us will come answer it. At this time, do you have any questions about the instructions
or procedures? If you have a question, please raise your hands and one of us will come to your
seat to answer it.
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Identification Number: _______________
Choose an effort level that is greater than or equal to 110 and less than or equal to 170, using
decimals to indicate fractions; e.g. wxy.z. Please only make a decision for period 1 at this time,
which is recorded in the top row.
period your
effort
other’s
effort
minimum
effort
effort cost
(.25) * your effort
your
earnings
in cents
additional
payment
1 + 60
2 + 60
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Appendix B: Data for the Minimum-Effort Game
Session 1: Effort Decisions (Other’s Decision) for Effort Cost c = 0.25
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 135
(140)
140
(155)
120
(110)
110
(120)
140
(135)
135.25
(148)
120
(170)
170
(120)
155
(140)
148
(135.25)
period 2 143.5
(170)
170
(143.5)
115.9
(170)
130
(140)
140
(130)
153.52
(130)
170
(115.9)
130
(153.52)
150
(128)
128
(150)
period 3 155
(111.9)
160
(140)
111.9
(155)
135
(170)
140
(140)
140
(138.9)
170
(135)
140
(140)
140
(160)
138.9
(140)
period 4 140
(140)
160
(150)
135.5
(145)
145
(135.5)
140
(140)
142.85
(170)
170
(142.85)
150
(139)
150
(160)
139
(150)
period 5 150
(150)
150
(150)
140.5
(140)
135.5
(145.28)
140
(140.5)
145.28
(135.5)
160
(139.9)
139.9
(160)
155
(138.9)
138.9
(155)
period 6 155.5
(149.9)
150
(160)
160.5
(140)
140
(155)
140
(148.52)
148.52
(140)
140
(160.5)
160
(150)
155
(140)
149.9
(155.5)
period 7 145
(140)
160
(160)
140.5
(170)
140
(153)
140
(145)
145.98
(150)
170
(140.5)
150
(145.98)
153
(140)
159
(160)
period 8 140
(146.54)
160
(140.5)
140.5
(160)
145
(140)
140
(145)
146.54
(140)
160
(145)
145
(160)
150
(169)
169
(150)
period 9 150
(164)
160
(140)
140
(160)
143
(140)
140
(143)
146.02
(160)
150
(155)
160
(146.02)
155
(150)
164
(150)
period 10 170
(170)
160
(155)
141.1
(140)
143
(160)
140
(141.1)
146.22
(149)
170
(170)
160
(143)
155
(160)
149
(146.22)
Session 2: Effort Decision (Other’s Decision) for Effort Cost c = 0.75
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 150
(139.8)
125
(148)
150
(170)
125
(160)
139.8
(150)
148
(125)
170
(150)
135.2
(110)
160
(125)
110
(135.2)
period 2 136.1
(170)
170
(130)
150
(150)
135
(129.6)
129.6
(135)
169
(140.5)
170
(136.1)
140.5
(169)
130
(170)
120
(120)
period 3 134.7
(170)
170
(110)
170
(134.7)
125
(140)
155
(150)
125
(125)
110
(170)
150
(155)
140
(125)
125
(125)
period 4 138.1
(145)
110
(135)
145
(138.1)
140
(140)
149
(125)
125
(149)
170
(145.5)
145.5
(170)
140
(140)
135
(110)
period 5 141.2
(110)
110
(135)
160
(140)
140
(170)
160
(129.6)
135
(110)
170
(140)
129.6
(160)
140
(160)
110
(141.2)
period 6 135
(145)
110
(150)
150
(110)
150
(140)
130.8
(115)
125
(125)
140
(150)
155.7
(125)
145
(145)
115
(130.8)
period 7 139
(125)
110
(140)
140
(140)
140
(140)
116
(145)
125
(125)
140
(110)
125
(125)
145
(116)
125
(139)
period 8 137
(125)
110
(150)
150
(110)
140
(130)
120
(140)
125
(137)
140
(120)
130
(140)
140
(125)
125
(140)
period 9 131
(140)
110
(135.4)
140
(131)
140
(140)
120
(125)
135
(140)
140
(140)
135.4
(110)
140
(135)
125
(120)
period 10 135
(135)
110
(121)
135
(135)
140
(120)
121
(110)
135
(140)
140
(125)
125
(140)
140
(135)
120
(140)
23
Session 3: Effort Decision (Other’s Decision) for Effort Cost c = 0.25
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 150
(170)
170
(133.3)
133.3
(170)
170
(150)
160.8
(140)
140
(160.8)
170
(110)
120
(170)
110
(170)
170
(120)
period 2 165
(150)
160
(110)
170
(170)
150
(165)
159.7
(140)
140
(159.7)
170
(140)
140
(170)
110
(160)
170
(170)
period 3 160
(160)
160
(140)
170
(140)
150
(170)
140
(170)
140
(160)
170
(150)
160
(160)
150
(170)
170
(150)
period 4 170
(150)
150
(170)
170
(140)
160
(160)
170
(170)
140
(170)
170
(170)
160
(160)
155
(170)
170
(155)
period 5 160
(170)
145
(160)
170
(160)
160
(145)
170
(160)
150
(170)
170
(160)
160
(170)
160
(170)
170
(150)
period 6 160
(160)
160
(170)
170
(160)
150
(150)
170
(170)
150
(150)
170
(170)
160
(160)
170
(170)
170
(170)
period 7 160
(170)
160
(170)
170
(150)
150
(160)
170
(160)
150
(170)
170
(170)
160
(150)
170
(160)
170
(170)
period 8 170
(170)
160
(170)
170
(155)
155
(170)
160
(155)
155
(160)
170
(160)
160
(170)
170
(170)
170
(160)
period 9 170
(170)
169.9
(170)
170
(160)
160
(170)
170
(170)
160
(170)
170
(160)
160
(170)
170
(169.9)
170
(160)
period 10 170
(160)
170
(170)
170
(170)
165
(160)
170
(170)
160
(170)
170
(170)
160
(165)
170
(170)
170
(170)
Session 4: Effort Decision (Other’s Decision) for Effort Cost c = 0.75
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 122
(130.5)
160
(150)
170
(110)
130.5
(122)
134.9
(170)
150
(160)
170
(150)
150
(170)
110
(170)
170
(134.9)
period 2 169
(110)
130
(170)
110
(169)
170
(130)
140
(110)
150
(140)
110
(150)
150
(110)
110
(140)
140
(150)
period 3 131
(195)
140
(140)
120
(140.2)
140.2
(120)
135
(110)
145
(131)
110
(135)
140
(140)
110
(140)
140
(110)
period 4 127
(130)
135
(110)
130
(135)
125
(110)
135
(130)
120
(110)
110
(135)
130
(127)
110
(120)
110
(125)
period 5 134
(110)
110
(130)
130
(110)
110
(130)
130
(110)
110
(134)
110
(110)
130
(110)
110
(110)
110
(130)
period 6 152
(110)
125
(120)
120
(128)
120
(110)
110
(152)
128
(120)
110
(110)
120
(125)
140
(110)
110
(120)
period 7 112
(120)
120
(112)
130
(130)
110
(110)
130
(130)
124
(110)
110
(120)
120
(110)
110
(110)
110
(124)
period 8 110
(115)
115
(110)
120
(110)
110
(120)
130
(110)
110
(130)
110
(110)
120
(110)
110
(110)
110
(120)
period 9 113
(110)
110
(110)
120
(110)
110
(110)
110
(110)
114
(110)
110
(110)
110
(113)
110
(120)
110
(114)
period 10 111
(110)
110
(110)
110
(111)
110
(110)
110
(110)
110
(110)
110
(110)
110
(110)
110
(110)
110
(110)
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Session 5: Effort Decision (Other’s Decision) for Effort Cost c = 0.25
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 157.2
(140)
110
(140)
140
(110)
170
(130)
160
(150)
130
(170)
150
(160)
150
(130)
140
(157.2)
130
(150)
period 2 143
(135)
140
(160)
135
(143)
110
(140)
160
(150)
170
(140)
150
(160)
140
(170)
160
(140)
140
(110)
period 3 161.3
(140)
145
(160)
150
(150)
140
(161.3)
150
(150)
150
(160)
150
(110)
160
(150)
160
(145)
110
(150)
period 4 159.9
(130)
160
(170)
130
(159.9)
150
(170)
170
(160)
170
(150)
170
(170)
170
(170)
170
(130)
130
(170)
period 5 132
(150)
170
(170)
150
(132)
150
(170)
170
(140)
170
(150)
140
(170)
170
(170)
160
(130)
130
(160)
period 6 141.8
(146)
170
(160)
146
(141.8)
170
(160)
160
(170)
160
(170)
150
(130)
170
(160)
160
(170)
130
(150)
period 7 142.6
(170)
170
(160)
142
(160)
170
(142.6)
160
(142)
160
(170)
150
(140)
170
(160)
160
(170)
140
(150)
period 8 140.4
(135.5)
165
(144)
144
(165)
160
(150)
170
(170)
170
(170)
150
(160)
170
(170)
170
(170)
135.5
(140.4)
period 9 145.1
(170)
170
(145.1)
151
(160)
160
(151)
170
(170)
170
(170)
150
(170)
170
(150)
170
(140)
140
(170)
period 10 146.5
(150)
170
(170)
147
(170)
170
(140)
170
(147)
170
(170)
150
(146.5)
170
(170)
170
(170)
140
(170)
Session 6: Effort Decision (Other’s Decision) for Effort Cost c = 0.75
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 110
(170)
170
(110)
140
(150)
159
(110)
130
(170)
110
(159)
150
(140)
120
(140)
140
(120)
170
(130)
period 2 170
(110)
170
(120)
140
(150)
120
(140)
140
(170)
110
(170)
150
(140)
120
(170)
140
(120)
170
(140)
period 3 135.15
(170)
170
(140)
170
(110)
111
(170)
170
(111)
110
(170)
150
(170)
170
(150)
140
(170)
170
(135.15)
period 4 141.67
(140)
140
(130)
140
(170)
130
(140)
130
(145)
145
(130)
170
(140)
150
(170)
140
(141.67)
170
(150)
period 5 137.19
(130)
140
(140)
140
(140)
110.1
(160)
130
(170)
130
(137.19)
160
(110.1)
150
(140)
140
(150)
170
(130)
period 6 158.75
(129)
140
(130)
140
(140)
150
(130)
140
(160)
130
(140)
160
(140)
130
(150)
140
(140)
129
(158.75)
period 7 116.85
(135)
135
(116.85)
140
(145)
110.1
(160)
145
(140)
130
(140)
160
(110.1)
140
(129)
140
(130)
129
(140)
period 8 140
(146)
128
(130)
140
(130)
130
(140)
130
(129)
130
(128)
160
(120)
120
(160)
140
(140)
129
(130)
period 9 140.10
(130)
130
(130)
140
(160)
130
(140)
120
(140)
130
(130)
160
(140)
130
(129)
140
(120)
129
(130)
period 10 125.87
(160)
130
(125)
140
(130)
129.9
(129)
130
(160)
130
(140)
160
(125.89)
125
(130)
160
(130)
129
(129.9)
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Appendix C: Data for the Three Person Median-Effort Game
Session 1: Effort Decisions (Others’ Decisions) for Effort Cost c = 0.10
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9
period 1 170
(130, 140)
110
(150, 170)
150
(110, 170)
140
(170, 130)
130
(170, 140)
170
(150, 110)
120
(110, 135)
135
(110, 120)
110
(120, 135)
period 2 170
(150, 140)
110
(110, 170)
135
(160, 140)
140
(150, 170)
160
(140, 135)
170
(110, 110)
150
(170, 140)
110
(110, 170)
140
(160, 135)
period 3 170
(110, 170)
110
(160, 150)
170
(110, 170)
110
(170, 170)
110
(150, 170)
150
(160, 110)
170
(110, 150)
160
(150, 110)
150
(110, 170)
period 4 170
(150, 165)
150
(110, 170)
170
(110, 150)
110
(150, 170)
110
(150, 170)
170
(110, 150)
165
(150, 170)
150
(110, 170)
150
(165, 170)
period 5 170
(150, 170)
150
(170, 170)
170
(110, 150)
110
(150, 170)
170
(170, 150)
170
(170, 150)
150
(110, 170)
150
(170, 170)
170
(150, 170)
period 6 110
(150, 170)
150
(110, 170)
170
(130, 170)
110
(160, 170)
170
(110, 150)
170
(130, 170)
130
(170, 170)
160
(110, 170)
170
(110, 160)
period 7 170
(160, 170)
170
(110, 160)
170
(165, 170)
165
(170, 170)
170
(160, 170)
170
(165, 170)
110
(160, 170)
160
(110, 170)
160
(170, 170)
period 8 170
(170, 170)
170
(170, 170)
170
(110, 170)
110
(170, 170)
170
(110, 170)
170
(115, 160)
115
(160, 170)
170
(170, 170)
160
(115, 170)
period 9 170
(170, 170)
170
(110, 160)
170
(170, 170)
110
(160, 170)
170
(170, 170)
170
(120, 160)
120
(160, 170)
160
(120, 170)
160
(110, 170)
period 10 110
(160, 170)
170
(150, 170)
150
(170, 170)
170
(160, 170)
170
(160, 170)
170
(150, 170)
170
(110, 160)
160
(170, 170)
160
(110, 170)
Session 2: Effort Decisions (Others’ Decisions) for Effort Cost c = 0.60
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10
period 1 110
(146, 150)
117
(110, 170)
170
(110, 117)
112
(110, 140)
155
(110, 146)
146
(110, 150)
110
(117, 170)
140
(112, 110)
110
(112, 140)
period 2 110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 133)
120
(110, 120)
133
(110, 110)
110
(120, 120)
120
(110, 120)
110
(110, 133)
period 3 110
(110, 110)
112
(115, 167)
110
(110, 115)
110
(110, 110)
115
(112, 167)
167
(112, 115)
110
(110, 115)
115
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
period 4 110
(110, 150)
150
(110, 110)
110
(110, 150)
110
(128, 145)
145
(110, 128)
128
(110, 145)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
period 5 110
(110, 145)
113
(117, 110)
110
(110, 145)
110
(110, 110)
145
(110, 110)
117
(113, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(113, 117)
period 6 110
(110, 111)
111
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
111
(110, 125)
125
(111, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 111)
110
(111, 125)
period 7 110
(110, 141)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
120
(110, 110)
141
(110, 110)
110
(110, 120)
110
(110, 120)
110
(110, 141)
period 8 110
(110, 110)
115
(112, 115)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
115
(112, 115)
112
(115, 115)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
period 9 110
(110, 110)
120
(117, 121)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
117
(120, 121)
121
(117, 120)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
period 10 110
(110, 125)
118
(110, 118)
110
(110, 125)
110
(110, 110)
118
(110, 118)
125
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(110, 110)
110
(118, 118)
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Session 3: Effort Decisions (Others’ Decisions) for Effort Cost c = 0.40
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9
period 1 150
(169, 110)
110
(150, 169)
140
(110, 110)
110
(140, 110)
110
(110, 170)
170
(110, 110)
169
(110, 150)
110
(110, 170)
110
(140, 110)
period 2 110
(140, 150)
111
(170, 170)
170
(111, 170)
110
(111, 170)
170
(111, 170)
150
(110, 140)
111
(110, 170)
170
(110, 111)
140
(110, 150)
period 3 110
(110, 113)
113
(110, 110)
170
(110, 140)
110
(110, 113)
145
(140, 150)
140
(110, 170)
150
(140, 145)
110
(140, 170)
140
(145, 150)
period 4 110
(140, 169)
170
(170, 170)
170
(170, 170)
169
(110, 140)
170
(170, 170)
140
(110, 110)
140
(110, 169)
110
(110, 140)
110
(110, 140)
period 5 110
(110, 155)
120
(140, 170)
170
(120, 140)
170
(110, 130)
110
(110, 155)
130
(110, 170)
155
(110, 110)
110
(130, 170)
140
(120, 170)
period 6 110
(130, 140)
160
(170, 140)
170
(145, 170)
170
(160, 140)
170
(145, 170)
130
(110, 140)
145
(170, 170)
140
(160, 170)
140
(110, 130)
period 7 110
(110, 145)
110
(110, 170)
170
(110, 170)
110
(170, 170)
170
(110, 170)
110
(110, 145)
145
(110, 110)
170
(110, 110)
110
(110, 170)
period 8 110
(110, 170)
170
(154, 170)
170
(110, 110)
154
(170, 170)
170
(154, 170)
130
(110, 140)
110
(110, 170)
140
(130, 110)
110
(130, 140)
period 9 110
(110, 140)
170
(170, 140)
170
(110, 140)
170
(170, 140)
110
(110, 140)
140
(110, 110)
110
(140, 170)
140
(170,170)
140
(110, 170)
period 10 110
(110, 170)
170
(110, 110)
110
(110, 140)
110
(110, 170)
170
(110, 110)
110
(110, 140)
110
(110, 170)
140
(110, 110)
110
(110, 140)
Session 4: Effort Decisions (Others’ Decisions) for Effort Cost c=0.40
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9
period 1 155
(170, 110)
110
(155, 170)
160
(168, 125)
125
(160, 168)
150
(110, 150)
168
(125, 160)
170
(110, 155)
150
(110, 150)
110
(150, 150)
period 2 145
(110, 169)
110
(145, 169)
166
(130, 160)
130
(160, 166)
110
(110, 170)
169
(110, 145)
170
(110, 110)
160
(130, 166)
110
(110, 170)
period 3 160
(120, 169)
110
(140, 150)
170
(110, 160)
160
(110, 170)
150
(140, 110)
169
(120, 160)
110
(160, 170)
140
(110, 150)
120
(160, 169)
period 4 160
(150, 145)
110
(120, 160)
162
(110, 115)
110
(115, 162)
150
(145, 160)
160
(110, 120)
145
(150, 160)
115
(110, 162)
120
(110, 160)
period 5 160
(160, 161)
110
(160, 155)
160
(160, 161)
161
(160, 160)
150
(120, 145)
160
(110, 155)
145
(120, 150)
155
(110, 160)
120
(145, 150)
period 6 160
(162, 169)
110
(120, 150)
162
(160, 169)
145
(160, 145)
150
(110, 120)
169
(160, 162)
145
(145, 160)
160
(145, 145)
120
(110, 150)
period 7 140
(110, 170)
110
(120, 169)
170
(110, 140)
110
(140, 170)
150
(145, 150)
169
(110, 120)
145
(150, 150)
150
(145, 150)
120
(110, 169)
period 8 160
(120, 140)
140
(141, 165)
165
(140, 141)
141
(140, 165)
125
(140, 169)
169
(125, 140)
145
(120, 160)
140
(125, 169)
120
(145, 160)
period 9 150
(110, 110)
110
(110, 150)
160
(120, 155)
110
(125, 160)
125
(110, 160)
160
(110, 125)
110
(110, 150)
155
(120, 160)
120
(155, 160)
period 10 150
(110, 145)
110
(150, 164)
164
(110, 150)
110
(145, 150)
125
(110, 160)
160
(110, 125)
145
(110, 150)
150
(110, 164)
110
(125, 160)
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Appendix D: Data for The Three Person Minimum-Effort Game
Session 1: Effort Decisions (Top) and Others’ Decisions (Bottom) for Effort Cost c = 0.50
subject 1 subject 2 subject 3 subject 4 subject 5 subject 6 subject 7 subject 8 subject 9 subject 10 subject 11 subject 12
125
110,140
125
140,170
125
130,170
170
125,130
130
170,170
170
125,140
170
130,170
170
130,170
140
110,125
140
125,170
130
125,170
110
125,140
110
110,170
110
170,170
150.5
150,150
130
150,170
150
150.5,150
170
110,110
170
110,110
170
130,150
110
110,170
150
150,150.5
150
130,170
110
110,170
150
110,140
110
110,160
144.9
110,155
150
170,170
155
110,144.9
170
150,170
110
110,160
170
150,170
110
140,150
160
110,110
140
110,150
110
144.9,155
150
110,110
170
170,170
115
110,170
170
110,150
150
110,170
170
170,170
110
110,150
170
170,170
110
150,170
170
110,115
110
115,170
110
110,150
110
110,170
170
110,120
110
110,150
150
110,110
110
120,170
170
110,110
120
110,170
170
140,140
110
110,170
140
140,170
140
140,170
110
110,150
120
130,170
140
110,140
120
110,110
140
110,140
120
150,170
170
120,135
110
110,120
150
120,170
110
110,170
135
120,170
170
120,150
110
110,120
130
110,120
110
170,140
112
110,130
130
110,170
150
110,170
170
110,150
110
130,170
170
110,140
110
140,140
140
110,170
170
110,130
110
150,170
120
120,130
120
130,170
130
120,120
120
120,130
130
110,170
140
110,110
120
110,130
170
120,130
110
112,130
130
120,170
110
120,130
110
110,140
130
110,140
125
120,120
120
120,125
130
120,125
120
140,150
140
110,130
120
110,170
170
110,120
110
110,140
140
120,150
150
140,120
110
120,170
110
130,140
125
130,170
119.9
110,110
125
125,110
170
125,130
140
110,130
110
110,119.9
130
110,140
110
110,119.9
125
110,125
130
125,170
110
125,125
Session 1: Effort Decisions (Top) and Others’ Decisions (Bottom) for Effort Cost c = 0.10
subject
1
subject
2
subject
3
subject
4
subject
5
subject
6
subject
7
subject
8
subject
9
subject
10
subject
11
subject
12
168
110,150
159.4
125,170
170
159.4,125
159
110,160
170
110,135.5
110
150,168
150
110,168
125
159.4,170
135.5
110,170
110
135.5,170
160
110,159
110
159,160
110
164,170
164
110,170
170
135.5,170
150
145,160
170
169.9,168
170
110,164
170
135.5,170
160
145,150
168
169.9,170
135.5
170,170
145
150,160
169.9
168,170
170
170,170
164
168,170
170
140,145
140
145,170
170
150,170
170
164,168
170
150,170
150
170,170
168
164,170
170
170,170
145
140,170
170
170,170
170
145,170
164
168,199
170
170,170
145
170,170
170
160,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
160
170,170
168
164,169
170
145,170
170
160,170
169
164,168
170
170,170
164
170,170
170
164,170
170
157,169
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
169
157,170
170
170,170
170
164,170
157
169,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
167.5,170
170
167.5,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
167.5
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
170
170,170
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